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Notes
Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act: Accidents
Arising Out of and In the Course of the Employment
The Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act requires that to re-
ceive compensation, an employee must suffer "personal injury or
death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment." Two elements of this requirement have proven most trou-
blesome for the Indiana courts: determining whether there has been
an "accident," and whether the accident arises out of the employ-
ment, that is, whether there is a causal nexus between the accident
and the employment. 2 Current Indiana case law manifests two dis-
tinct tests for determining whether a compensable accident has oc-
curred: the unexpected event theory and the unexpected result
theory. 3 This note proposes that courts apply the unexpected result
The relevant provision of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act states: "[E]very
employer and every employee, except as herein stated, shall be required to comply with the
provisions of this law, respectively to pay and accept compensation for personal injury or
death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall be bound
thereby." IND. CODE § .22-3-2-2 (1976). Thus, the Workmen's Compensation Act was designed
to provide the exclusive remedy for employees who suffer work-related injuries.
Also, it should be noted that the phrase "accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment" was created to abrogate the use of common-law tort principles in the context
of the employment relationship. The court in Stainbrook v. Johnson Co. Farm Bureau, 125
Ind. App. 487, 491, 122 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1954) (en banc) stated:
The basic principle of the Compensation Act is based upon the proposition that
the common-law rule of liability for personal injuries incident to the operation
of industrial enterprises based upon negligence of the employer with its defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk is inapplicable to modem
conditions of employment.
Accord, Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
2 For a comprehensive discussion of the varying interpretations of "accident" which
arose from the Indiana Supreme Court decision in United States Steel Corp. v. Dykes, 238
Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111 (1958), see Note, The Meaning of the Term "Accident" in the
Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, 13 VAL. L. Rv. 535 (1979).
2 In defining the unexpected event our courts have utilized two theories: the
unexpected cause and the unexpected result. Under the unexpected cause
theory an 'accident' cannot occur in the absence of some kind of increased risk
or hazard, e.g., a fall, slip, trip, unusual exertion, malfunction of machine,
break, collision, etc., which causes an injury. Under the unexpected result
theory an 'accident' may occur where everything preceding the injury was nor-
mal, and only the injury itself was unexpected, e.g., where a worker bends over,
stoops, turns, lifts something, etc., which activity is part of his every day work
duties, and yet, . . . he is unexpectedly injured.
Ellis v. Hubbell Metals, Inc., - Ind. App. , , 366 N.E.2d 207, 211-12 (1977)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis in the original).
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theory as the appropriate test of whether an accident has occurred.
Adoption of the unexpected result theory would place primary em-
phasis on identifying the causal nexus between the accident and the
employment. An analysis of factually complex cases, such as where
an injury aggravates a pre-existing condition or where cumulative
accidents produce an injury, will demonstrate that the causation
issue focuses on criteria more relevant to the ultimate question of
whether the employer should compensate the employee. Finally, it
will be proposed that a logical consequence of emphasizing the cau-
sation factor would be to apportion liability in pre-existing condi-
tion cases.'
ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE
The Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act provision requiring
personal injury to be "by accident arising out of and in the course
of the employment," discloses four distinct components.5 First, an
injury must have been sustained by the employee.' Second, the
injury must be "by accident"-a phrase subject to numerous inter-
'IND. CODE § 22-3-3-12 (1976).
If an employee has sustained a permanent injury either in another employment,
or from other cause or causes than the employment in which he received a
subsequent permanent injury by accident, such as specified in section 31 [22-
3-3-10], he shall be entitled to compensation for the subsequent permanent
injury in the same amount as if the previous injury had not occurred: Provided,
however, That if the permanent injury for which compensation is claimed, re-
sults only in the aggravation or increase of a previously sustained permanent
injury or physical condition, regardless of the source or cause of such previously
sustained injury or physical condition, the board shall determine the extent of
the previously sustained permanent injury or physical condition, as well as the
extent of the aggravation or increase resulting from the subsequent permanent
injury, and shall award compensation only for that part of such injury, or physi-
cal condition resulting from the subsequent permanent injury.
Id. (emphasis added).
See B. SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON LAW OF INDIANA (1950), for a general treatise on
this subject.
I This is a basic evidentiary issue, common also to tort law, which turns on the facts of
each case. Certainly the most essential aspect of a workmen's compensation claim, and
usually the least troublesome, is offering probative evidence regarding damage. However, one
aspect of an injury which still presents problems to the courts occurs when the claimant seeks
compensation for mental injury. The basic rule was enunciated in E.I. DuPont De Nemours
& Co. v. Green, 116 Ind. App. 283, 287, 63 N.E.2d 547, 548 (1945):
[W]hen a purely mental condition known as a neurosis is shown by competent
evidence to be the direct result of a physical injury sustained by an employee
arising out of and in the course of the employment and which neurosis, through
functional disturbances of the nervous system, disables the employee from work-
ing at his former occupation, he has suffered a compensable injury under the
terms of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act.
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pretations. 7 The third aspect of this provision is the requirement
that the accident arise from the employment. This presents perhaps
the most elusive issue, and can be best characterized as a problem
of causation. Finally, it must also be demonstrated that the injury
was sustained in the course of employment.8 While the words
"arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are
descriptive of its character, the words "in the course of" refer to the
time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurs. All
four elements must be proved before the Industrial Board9 in order
for a claimant to be entitled to compensation. 10
The plaintiff's burden of proof is somewhat mitigated, however,
because these statutory requirements are subject to a rule of liberal
construction." In keeping with the purposes of workmen's compen-
sation, the Indiana courts have consistently emphasized that they
are required to interpret liberally the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. - The courts, however, also recognize that the
Act does not contemplate that the employer be liable for all injuries
occurring at the place of employment. The most recent decision by
the Indiana Supreme Court stated that "[ilt is not sufficient to
merely show that a claimant worked for the employer during the
period of his life in which his disability arose."' "
I "The meaning assigned to the word 'accident,' as used in compensation acts, must be
distinguished from its meaning as used in accident insurance policies." Indian Creek Coal &
Mining Co. v. Calvert, 68 Ind. App. 474, 483, 119 N.E. 519, 522 (1918). "[Tlhe word
'accident' as used in accident policies, 'should be given its ordinary and usual signification
as being an event that takes place without one's foresightor explanation.'" Schmid v. Indi-
ana Travelers' Accident Ass'n, 42 Ind. App. 483, 495, 85 N.E. 1032, 1037 (1908) (quoting
Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Garrigus, 104 Ind. 133, 140, 3 N.E. 818,
822 (1885)).
1 The Indiana standard with respect to whether an injury occurs within the course of
employment, was succinctly expressed in Laesar v. Anderson, 99 Ind. App. 428, 434, 192 N.E.
762, 765 (1934) (quoting Jeffries v. Pitman-Moore Co., 83 Ind. App. 159, 161, 147 N.E. 919,
920 (1925)). The court stated that the accident must take place "within the period of employ-
ment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is fulfilling the duties
of his employment, or is engaged in doing something incidental to it."
I The Industrial Board consists of seven members, appointed by the Governor, not more
than four of whom shall belong to the same political party. The chairman must be an attorney
of recognized qualifications. IND. CODE § 22-3-1-1 (1976) specifies the terms and duties of the
Industrial Board.
11 The Workmen's Compensation claimant must prove his case "by evidence of probative
value, free from conjecture, surmise, or mere guess . . . ... B.P.O. Elks, #209 v. Sponholtz,
144 Ind. App. 150, 156, 244 N.E.2d 923, 926 (1969).
"1 Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1973).
'2 Motor Dispatch, Inc. v. Snodgrass, 157 Ind. App. 591, 594, 301 N.E.2d 251, 253 (1973),
rev'd & remanded on other grounds, - Ind. -, 362 N.E.2d 489 (1977); Haskell & Barker
Car Co. v. Brown, 67 Ind. App. 178, 188, 117 N.E. 555, 558 (1917).




INJURIES WHICH AGGRAVATE PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS
The problems courts face in determining whether an accident
arises from the employment are particularly acute in cases where a
pre-existing disease or condition has been found. Pursuant to the
statute, the courts must decide whether the injury occurred by acci-
dent, and if a sufficient causal connection exists between the em-
ployment and the accident.
The Indiana Supreme Court in United States Steel Corp. v.
Dykes dealt with the latter issue, causation, while denying compen-
sation to the employee. 4 Dykes involved an employee who suffered
a heart attack after a short walk from the water cooler. There was
evidence of a pre-existing disease, but no evidence of aggravation
due to unusual exertion, since the work that day was slower than
normal. The court framed the issue in terms of whether the dece-
dent's heart failure was caused by an increase in the work load, or
a decrease in the heart's ability to meet unchanged demands of
employment.' 5 This emphasized the causal relationship between
injury and employment, as required by the statutory phrase "arising
out of the employment."'" Compensation was denied because evi-
dence demonstrated that the employment was not the cause of dece-
dent's fatal heart attack. To be compensable, the accident must
arise from the employment; a causal relationship must exist be-
tween the accident and the employment. The court stressed that the
Workmen's Compensation Act was not enacted to compensate em-
ployees for injuries caused by the normal wear of living.' 7
,1 238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111 (1958).
Is Is the evidence competent to show that decedent died as a result of an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment or that there was a
causal connection between his heart attack and his employment?
The causal question here is: Was the inability of decedent's heart to meet the
demands, i.e., the 'coronary insufficiency,' caused by a change, i.e., an increase
in the work load beyond the heart's ability to function, or by a decrease in the
heart's ability to meet an unchanged demand. The 'cause' is that which has
changed, not that which remains constant.
Id. at 607-08, 154 N.E.2d at 116.
" The Indiana Supreme Court quoted extensively from the Medical Trial Technique
Quarterly, where Dr. Alan Moritz writes: "If the event stipulated is clearly unusual and if it
was followed immediately by heart failure, the relationship may be reasonably clear." Id. at
612 n.3, 154 N.E.2d at 118 n.3.
,7 Under the evidence in this case decedent's fatal heart attack might have
happened while he was working, driving his car, sitting or even sleeping. It
happened while he was working at his usual occupation; and in such event, it
could be said that his heart failed because it could not handle the load then
demanded of it.
Id. at 611, 154 N.E.2d at 118.
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While emphasizing the causation issue, the court in Dykes
avoided the opportunity to address the issue of whether a heart
attack, without stimulus from an external event, fell within the
statutory definition of an accident. The supreme court's emphasis
on causation, however, does not mean that workmen's compensa-
tion law should disregard the statutory term "accident," by denying
it independent meaning. Two divergent theories have been devel-
oped by the Indiana courts to interpret the term: the unexpected
event theory and the unexpected result theory. 8 The unexpected
event theory, articulated in Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Brown,
defines an accident as "any unlooked for mishap or untoward event
not expected or designed."19 The two elements of the unexpected
event theory are the unforeseeability or unexpectedness of the
event, and a sudden event or occurrence. In contrast, the unex-
pected result theory defines an accident as an unexpected result or
consequence unintended by the employee.20 Thus, under the unex-
pected result theory an accident occurs where only the injury itself
was unexpected.
The Indiana Supreme Court explicitly adopted the unexpected
event theory in Calhoun v. Hillenbrand Industries, Inc. 21 The claim-
ant in Calhoun was engaged in the normal labor of lifting boxes
when she started to feel pain in her back. The Industrial Board
refused compensation on the grounds that no accident occurred,
since "there was no specific time or incident that could be pointed
to that would cause the pain in plaintiff's back. '"22 The supreme
18 Neither theory encompasses the notion that an accident must be an unintentional event.
In the workmen's compensation context, "[an injury may be the result of accidental means,
though the act involving the accident was intentional." General Am. Tank Car Corp. v.
Weirick, 77 Ind. App. 242, 245, 133 N.E. 391, 392 (1921). This approach protects the employee
where his acts are done intentionally in the course of employment, but where he does not
foresee or comprehend the possible adverse consequences.
" 67 Ind. App. 178, 187, 117 N.E. 555, 557 (1917).
20 An important precedent for the unexpected result theory was Indian Creek Coal &
Mining Co. v. Calvert, 68 Ind. App. 474, 492, 119 N.E. 519, 524 (1918). The court stated:
It is no longer required that the causes external to the plaintiff himself, which
contribute to bring about the injury, shall be in anyway unusual; it is enough
that the causes, themselves known and usual, should produce a result which on
a particular occasion is neither designed nor expected. The test as to whether
an injury is unexpected and so if received on a single occasion occurs 'by acci-
dent' is that the sufferer did not intend or expect that injury would on that
particular occasion result from what he was doing.
Id. at 492, 119 N.E.2d at 524 (quoting Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's
Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L. REv. 328, 340 (1912)).
21 "It is well settled under our law that in order to show an accident there must be some
untoward or unexpected event." - Ind. 381 N.E.2d 1242, 1244 (1978) (two
justices dissenting).
12 Id. at -, 381 N.E.2d at 1243.
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court upheld the decision of the Industrial Board as the trier of
fact, 23 and reversed the court of appeals' conclusion that the back
injury "was attributable to the gradual wear and tear from bending
and lifting during the performance of her normalwork duties, and
manifested itself on the day the pain commenced. '24
However, adoption of the unexpected event theory in Calhoun is
inconsistent with the supreme court's prior decision in United
States Steel Corp. v. Dykes.2 5 Under the unexpected event theory,
an accident never occurred in Dykes: since the heart attack mani-
fested itself while the claimant was walking back from the water
cooler, it is impossible to point to an external event which would
qualify as an accident. It follows that if there were no accident, the
case could have been summarily dismissed because the claimant
failed to prove a necessary element of the statute; the court need
never have reached the causation question of whether the accident
arose from the employment. The only plausible explanation of the
Dykes decision, therefore, is that the court considered aggravation
of a pre-existing condition an unexpected everit. The Dykes court,
in distinguishing compensable cases from the case with which it was
presented, stated that "[i]n each of the [compensable] instances
the fatal heart attack was preceded by some type of untoward or
unexpected incident, or there was evidence of the aggravation of a
previously deteriorated heart or blood vessel. ' 2 Thus, the court
implies that aggravation is an alternative to an unexpected event
and is an additional definition of accident. Aggravation leading to
injury can occur over extended periods of time, however, so this
alternative definition is inconsistent with the court's recent pro-
nouncement in Calhoun that there must be a specific incident.
Moreover, the aggravation requirement pertains to the issue of caus-
ation; it calls for a determination of whether the employment or the
pre-existing condition is responsible for the injury. This is not to
23 The standard for review of an Industrial Board decision was pronounced in Martinez v.
Taylor Forge & Pipe Works, __ Ind. App. -, 368 N.E.2d 1176 (1977).
This court in reviewing a decision of the Industrial Board will only consider that
evidence which supports the decision and reasonable inferences therefrom. The
court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. On
appeal from a negative decision, appellants must show that the decision was
contrary to law by showing that the evidence was without conflict, that it would
lead to but one conclusion, and that the Industrial Board reached the opposite
conclusion.
Id. at __, 368 N.E.2d at 1177-78.
21 Calhoun v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., - Ind. App..... 374 N.E.2d 54, 56, rev'd,
381 N.E.2d 1242 (1978).
238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111 (1958).
[Vol. 55:375
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
contend that aggravation of a pre-existing injury not be considered
compensable, but rather that aggravation is merely probative of
causation, and under the unexpected event theory is not a logical
substitute for the accident requirement.
While the present position of the Indiana Supreme Court liberal-
izes the accident requirement for employees with pre-existing inju-
ries, it also produces the anomaly that healthy employees are sub-
ject to a narrower definition of accident. A healthy employee must
prove a specific external event, whereas the employee with a pre-
existing condition has a lesser burden since the aggravation stan-
dard is broader. Aggravation can occur through an increased work
load or extreme exertion. If an employee with a pre-existing heart
condition had a heart attack while returning from the water cooler,
he need only prove that his work load was increased on the day in
question to satisfy the accident requirement. The previously healthy
employee under the same circumstances may not be able to meet
the accident requirement since there is no specific unexpected event
or incident.
The court's analysis in Dykes is more consistent with the unex-
pected result theory. This approach would characterize the heart
attack as an accident, because it is a result or consequence unin-
tended by the employee. Under the unexpected result theory, an
accident may occur where events preceding the injury were foresee-
able, and only the injury itself was unexpected. The question then
is whether the accident arose out of the employment."7
Where a pre-existing condition or disease occurs, proving aggrava-
tion of the injury would be crucial in obtaining compensation under
the unexpected result test. Thus, while the court has explicitly
adopted the unexpected event theory in Calhoun, the aggravation
requirement where pre-existing conditions are present, set forth in
Dykes, is a significant departure. Since in the case of a pre-existing
21 United States Steel Corp. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 611, 154 N.E.2d 111, 117 (1958). The
cases cited by the court as properly compensable reveal authority for its position that "an
occurrence, which merely hastens an existing disease to its final culmination, will be deemed
an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. . . ." Utilities Coal
Co. v. Herr, 76 Ind. App. 312, 315, 132 N.E. 262, 263 (1921). Accord, E. Rauh & Sons Fertilizer
Co. v. Adkins, 126 Ind. App. 251, 129 N.E.2d 358 (1958), where the court supported the view
that aggravation is the crucial factor and ignored the issue of whether the aggravation was
the result of normal work duties, or an accidental or unexpected event.
" The court in Ellis v. Hubbell Metals, Inc., Ind. App. ._, _, 366 N.E.2d 207,
212 (1977), adopted the unexpected result theory as "more in keeping with the humanitarian
purposes that underlie the Workmen's Compensation Act. . . ." The court further held that
''a worker may be awarded compensation when a preexisting condition is aggravated by an




injury the court broadened the accident definition to focus on the
causation issue, it is inequitable to require the healthy employee to
surmount a more difficult definitional hurdle.
Seemingly persuasive arguments can be made against the unex-
pected result theory. It has been observed that under the unex-
pected result theory "any pre-existing illness the symptoms of
which were manifest during the working hours of the day would have
to be considered as arising 'out of' and 'in the course of' employ-
ment,"28 rendering the finding of cause a nullity. The better view,
however, is that the unexpected result theory is relevant only to
whether there is an accident, and does not pre-empt the causation
issue embedded in the "arising out of the employment" require-
ment.
The case of Martinez v. Taylor Forge & Pipe Works shows that
the unexpected result test need not subsume the causation ques-
tion.29 In Martinez, the issue was whether noise-induced hearing loss
is compensable under the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act.
Analyzing the case under the unexpected result theory, the court
held that even though a high level of noise existed at the plant, the
employees did not suffer an "accident" within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The court noted that "the claimants
suffered neither unexpected nor unforeseen hearing loss from their
normal work activities."3 Quoting extensively from the Industrial
Board's findings (based on the parties' stipulations of fact) the court
emphasized that members of the general public suffer noise-induced
hearing loss caused by noise exposure away from their places of
employment. Additionally, employees' hearing loss could be a con-
sequence of old age. The court, holding the employer not liable,
could not distinguish hearing loss caused by normal wear of every-
day living from loss caused by employment. Martinez thus demon-
strates that the unexpected result theory does not render the causa-
tion issue meaningless. On the contrary, the court still requires that
an accident, as defined by the unexpected result theory, arise from
the employment.
CUMULATIVE ACCIDENTS
The concept of "cumulative accidents" presents a further diffi-
culty the courts have had in developing a sound interpretation of the
21 Id. at -, 366 N.E.2d at 215 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
29 - Ind. App. -, 368 N.E.2d 1176 (1977).
Id. at -, 368 N.E.2d at 1178.
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statutory provision "accidents arising out of and in the course of the
employment." The phrase "cumulative accidents" refers to situa-
tions where one specific event or occurrence cannot be labeled the
sole cause of the injury: it is the cumulative effect of many events,
loosely termed accidents, that produces the harm. This problem is
portrayed in American Maize Products Co. v. Nichiporchnik,3
where a repetition of relatively slight blows from an air hammer over
a ten year period culminated in a disability. The court viewed the
effect of the series of blows as unintended and unexpected, holding
that "it is not necessary that the accident occur at any particular
or specific time. '" 2 In essence, the court allowed a series of events
to fall within the statutory term "accident." This case provided the
foundation for the unexpected result theory, which focuses on the
unforeseeability of the injury to the employee. By finding a direct
causal connection between the work-related cause and the injury,
the court labeled the injury an accident.
However, the Supreme Court of Indiana in Calhoun, while adopt-
ing the unexpected event theory, indicated that it agreed with the
conclusion in American Maize. 3 The Calhoun court stated that
"[t]he American Maize court found that under those circum-
stances, the claimant was not bound to show the resultant injury
and damage was due to one particular blow which produced the
particular injury. '34 By allowing compensation for a condition ap-
pearing after ten years of repeated minor blows to the hand, it is
unlikely that the court actually found an untoward or unexpected
event. It is more likely that the causation issue so heavily favored
the plaintiff that the court felt the unforeseeable consequences of a
work-related incident occurring over ten years were sufficient proof
'of an accident. This becomes evident when comparing the fact situ-
ation in Calhoun with American Maize. The question which imme-
diately presents itself is why bending to lift boxes could not also
accumulate to produce an accident. The cases can be reconciled,
however, on the ground that back problems can be caused by a
variety of sources, whereas the unique nature of the plaintiff's dis-
abled hand could not easily result from normal living.
Thus, the problem of "cumulative accidents" demonstrates an-
other serious flaw in the unexpected event theory. The validity of
the unexpected event theory as the proper interpretation of
11 108 Ind. App. 502, 29 N.E.2d 801 (1940).
212 Id. at 511, 29 N.E.2d at 805.
Calhoun v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., - Ind. 381 N.E.2d 1242, 1244 (1978)
(two justices dissenting).
2 Id. at _, 381 N.E.2d at 1244.
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"accident" loses credibility when the requirement of a specific event
is liberalized to include a series of events which occurred over ten
years before the injury to the employee. Requiring that an accident
be characterized in terms of a specific event clutters the law with
distinctions more illusory than real. The issue ought to be whether
the injury was an unexpected result of employment. There must be
a distinct and undeniable causal connection between the injury and
employment, an issue more susceptible to proof since expert testi-
mony can aid the court in determining whether the necessary causal
connection exists. While the primary advantage of the unexpected
event theory is the evidentiary value of requiring one distinct, exter-
nal event, the employee can easily fabricate the event by describing
the harm as occurring after a slip, twist, fall or blow. The Indiana
Supreme Court's departures from the requirement of an unex-
pected event (e.g., aggravation in the case of a pre-existing condi-
tion) and permitting the accumulation of many accidents over time,
endorse the recognition that this theory should not be adhered to by
the courts as the conclusive test of whether an accident has oc-
curred.
Analysis of existing case law demonstrates that the unexpected
result theory should be adopted by the courts as the definition of
accident; nevertheless, the Indiana Supreme Court has adopted the
unexpected event theory, and workmen's compensation cases must
be approached in light of this recognition. Significantly, however,
the supreme court has retreated from its requirement of a specific
external event in two situations. Where no Single event has been
found to cause the injury, but instead an accumulation of events,
the court has granted compensation. This liberalizing approach re-
flects an appreciation of the important counterbalancing role causa-
tion should play in favor of the employee; that is, where the causal
nexus is clearly established, the court minimizes the requirement of
an accident. The court also retreats from the unexpected event
theory where aggravation of a pre-existing injury is found. Here
again, the court limits the role of accident criteria, and focuses on
the importance of causation.
APPORTIONMENT: A PROPOSAL
Carried to its logical conclusion, emphasis on the causation issue
compels apportionment of liability in pre-existing condition cases.
The Indiana Workmen's Compensation Apportionment Statute
provides that a subsequent employment injury which increases or
aggravates a previously sustained permanent injury or physical con-
[Vol. 55:375
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dition be compensable only for that part of the injury or condition
resulting from the subsequent injury.3 5 The purpose of the Appor-
tionment Statute, according to the Indiana Supreme Court, is to
"remove one of the major barriers against the employment of the
physically handicapped by dealing more fairly with the employer of
such persons ."3 This approach is a notable departure from the law
as it existed prior to 1945. 37 Before the present amendment was
enacted in 1945, "the sum total of the prior conditions and the
increase or aggravation thereof by a subsequent injury was com-
pensable. '38 No longer is an employer required to pay compensation
a second time for the same impairment, or pay compensation for an
impairment wholly unrelated to the present employment.
According to the majority view in Indiana, however, the statute
applies only to a claimant already suffering an impairment or disa-
bility, as distinguished from "the exacerbation or aggravation of a
pre-existing, but non-impairing and non-disabling condition of the
body. ' '3 With respect to employees' physical conditions rendering
them more susceptible to injury, the employer still must fully com-
pensate for the injury. Thus, the employer must take his employees
as he finds them. This leads to results such as that in Goodman v.
Olin Matheison Chemical Corp.,"0 where the court reversed the In-
dustrial Board's findings that of the plaintiff's present total impair-
ment, thirty percent was caused by the accidental injury, and the
remaining seventy percent was related to an arthritis condition
which pre-existed the accident.4 ' The court in Goodman stated une-
quivocally that a subsequent impairment or disability should not be
apportioned between the accident and the pre-existing condition.,
The interpretation and application of the Apportionment Statute
should be reconsidered in light of the causation analysis. The dis-
senting opinion in Goodman observed that "the majority have ig-
nored the words 'previously sustained permanent injury or physical
condition' in the apportionment statute. ' 43 Thus, the view that pre-
existing conditions should be apportioned finds direct support in the
statute. This position recognizes that the complex factual issue of
11 See note 3 supra.
3' Kinzie v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 235 Ind. 592, 600, 134 N.E.2d 212, 216 (1956).
" Moore v. Staton, 120 Ind. App. 339, 341, 92 N.E.2d 564, 565 (1950).
='Id.
3' Goodman v. Olin Matheison Chem. Corp., - Ind. App. -, -, 367 N.E.2d 1140,
1144 (1977).
40 Id.
" Id. at __, 367 N.E.2d at 1142-43 (quoting from the certified findings and award).
' Id. at -, 367 N.E.2d at 1143.
,3 Id. at -, 367 N.E.2d at 1146 (Buchanan, J., dissenting).
19801
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
causation can be decided equitably where compensation in the law
is not "all or nothing.""
This approach should not apply where the pre-existing condition
has no causal connection with the injury caused by the employment
accident.4 5 However, in cases such as Goodman, the Industrial
Board should be able to apportion liability where the total disability
cannot be attributed to the accidental injury, "but rather comes
from conditions that. . . were totally unrelated to [the] accidental
injury, excepting insofar as [it] . . . may have lead [sic], in part,
to [the employee's] present total disability from following any
gainful employment."" While mathematical certainty is impossi-
ble, the Industrial Board nevertheless should have the authority to
" Recent federal laws prohibiting employers which receive federal financial assistance from
discriminating against the handicapped, further support use of the Indiana Apportionment
Statute where claimants have pre-existing conditions: "No otherwise qualified handicapped
individual in the United States. . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ... 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
Regulations and standards propounded by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare pursuant to the federal statute have been recognized by the Seventh Circuit in Lloyd
v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). The court in Lloyd stated: "HEW
is given the responsibility of establishing standards for who are 'handicapped individuals' and
for determining what are discriminatory practices . . . ... Id. at 1281.
The federal statute has also broadened the definition of the term "handicapped person."
The court in Lloyd noted that "one of the principal purposes of the 1974 Rehabilitation Act
Amendments was to include within Section 504 individuals who may have been unintention-
ally excluded from its protection by the original definition of handicapped individuals which
over-emphasized employability." Id. at 1285 n.25. Consequently, "handicapped person" now
means any person who has a record of an impairment, or is regarded as having such an
impairment. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1977). Physical or mental impairment has been loosely
defined as any physiological or mental disorder or condition. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(6)(2) (1977).
Thus, the Department states that a person falls within the statute if he has a physical or
mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities, but that is treated
by the employer as constituting such limitation, and on the basis of that determination the
employer denies employment. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1977).
The federal rehabilitation statute can have an adverse effect on Indiana Workmen's Com-
pensation law. When an employer refuses to hire an individual with no present disability,
but a long medical history of prior back problems and a present back condition which does
not impair his ability to work, under the existing interpretation of the Apportionment Statute
the applicant suffers from no apportionable disability. If, however, the applicant is a handi-
capped person within the federal statute, and the employer receives federal financial assis-
tance, employment cannot be denied. When an employer is legally bound to hire a particular
employee with a known increased potential for injury, it is unjust to require that an employee
must be taken as the employer finds him.
" This approach would not reverse the line of reasoning exemplified in Noble County
Highway Dep't v. Sorgenfrei, 163 Ind. App. 81, 321 N.E.2d 766 (1975), where an employee's
latent leukemia condition was not a causal factor in the accident. Apportionment is proper,
however, where the condition contributes as a cause of the accident itself. See also Parks v.
Sheller-Globe Corp., - Ind. App. -, 380 N.E.2d 110 (1978).
- Ind. App. - , 367 N.E.2d at 1142-43 (quoting the Board's findings).
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make this determination on the basis of expert testimony. This
would aid employees with physical conditions and handicaps by
increasing employment opportunities, and would also be consistent
with recent federal laws prohibiting employers receiving federal fi-
nancial assistance from discriminating against the handicapped. 7
Employers would be less wary of hiring those with a greater poten-
tial for injury if they could be confident of a fair and equitable
compensation settlement.
CONCLUSION
The unexpected event theory has not provided the answer to the
interpretative problems surrounding application of the phrase
"accidents arising out of the employment" in Indiana workmen's
compensation law. Judge Buchanan, in a dissenting opinion in
Inland Steel Co. v. Almodavar, aptly describes the unsettled state
of the law with respect to this issue when he states:
"Accident" as a word of art in Workmen's Compensation law
has become as mysterious as the Loch Ness monster ... and
awaits the attention of the Supreme Court or the Legislature."
The adoption of the unexpected result test as the definition of acci-
dent would shift the emphasis away from a semantic dispute and
focus instead on the underlying causation issues: the determination
of whether an accident arises out of the employment should be
based on an analysis of whether the employment caused the injury.
This approach would assist the courts when facing the problem of
cumulative accidents, where no one event can be singled out as the
cause of the injury. In addition, apportionment provides a solution
to the problem cases where a causal connection between employ-
ment and the injury is not clearly established, as exemplified by
cases involving pre-existing conditions. Utilization of the unex-
pected result theory, coupled with emphasis on causation and ex-
pansion of the scope of apportionment, benefits both the employer
and employee by basing compensation on the causation issue, which
is susceptible to proof. The unexpected result theory is thus prefera-
ble to the unexpected event theory which hinges on illusory, defini-
tional criteria.
MARY MARGARET NOLD
7 See note 42, supra.
" Inland Steel Co. v. Almodovar, - Ind. App. 361 N.E.2d 181, 189 (1977).
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